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3 
Introduction 
There is growing interest in the effects of China’s extraordinary industrial dynamism on its 
neighbours (Eichengreen 2006; Humphrey and Schmitz 2007). With its huge size, vast low-
cost labour force, and deep industrial foundation, China has become a major producer of a 
wide range of manufactured goods (Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins 2007) that is now moving 
towards the acquisition of innovation capabilities (Altenburg, Schmitz and Stamm 2008; 
Dahlman 2009). The impact of China’s rapid economic growth is felt globally via international 
trade (Dimaranan, Ianchovichina and Martin 2007). Particularly among China’s less-
developed neighbours trying to develop their own industries, one of the most pressing 
questions is: does China’s economic rise help or hinder the industrial development of its 
neighbours? 
The recent literature argues that the answer to the above question depends to a 
considerable extent on the status of the country (Eichengreen 2006; Humphrey and Schmitz 
2007). According to these authors, Asia’s more advanced nations benefit from the 
complementary effects of Chinese industrialisation. China’s rise as a platform for labour-
intensive international trade helps the industrial development of these countries because 
Chinese exports depend to a great extent on capital equipment and components sourced 
from such countries. China’s less-developed neighbours however suffer from the competitive 
effects of its growth. China’s rise often hinders the industrial development of these countries 
as they specialise in labour-intensive industries in which China has come to play a dominant 
global role. Their opportunities for exporting to China meanwhile are limited in the main to 
unprocessed products. 
This study acknowledges the above distinction as an important starting point, but attempts to 
take the debate one step further. A critical element missing from the existing literature is the 
dynamics of change over time. To date, limited empirical research has shed light on how the 
impact of China’s economic rise has shifted over time, and why it has done so. The present 
research paper seeks to fill these knowledge gaps, which it attempts by engaging in a 
longitudinal analysis of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. 
In the early 2000s, just a few years after domestic production of motorcycles started, 
Vietnam was hit by massive imports of low-priced Chinese motorcycle components that 
imitated Japanese products. This so-called ‘China shock’ (Fujita 2007) initially caused 
serious damage to the nascent local motorcycle production sector. However, in the longer 
term, the competitive effects of this incident completely transformed the industry. As early as 
2005, a leading economist described the Vietnamese motorcycle sector as having ‘already 
achieved high degrees of scale merit, product quality and competitiveness’ (Ohno 2005: 47). 
Moreover, by 2013, Vietnam had emerged as the world’s fourth largest producer of 
motorcycles, with major foreign manufacturers achieving local content ratios of 90 to 95 per 
cent and even exporting their products to Asian and European markets (Quoc 2013: 17). 
Clearly, this is a rare success for a country with less than 20 years’ history in import-
substituting production. The present paper examines the processes and mechanisms by 
which China’s severe competitive effects were transmuted into positive results. 
Although the effects of the rise of Chinese manufacturing industries have been observed 
globally, this paper focuses specifically on China’s less-developed neighbours.1 These 
countries depend heavily on imports from China owing to their geographical proximity – 
                                               
1
 The literature analyses the impact of China’s industrial development on Latin America (Moreira 2007; Alvarez and Claro 2009; 
Jenkins, Peters and Moreira 2009); Africa (Kaplinsky 2008; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Tegegne 2009); and South Asia 
(Sonobe and Otsuka 2010). Reference to this literature is made where relevant. 
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some of them even share common borders with China (Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong 2007).2 
This means that nowhere else is the impact of Chinese trade felt more strongly than in these 
countries. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the existing literature 
and elaborates the research question. Section 2 discusses the research methodology. 
Section 3 analyses how the impact of China’s rise on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
changed in the short and medium terms, and Section 4 discusses why the impact changed 
over time. Finally, the concluding section draws out the key insights derived from the study, 
and enumerates areas for future research. 
 
                                               
2
 Whereas the average level of dependence on Chinese imports for emerging and developing countries globally in 2010 was 9 
per cent, such a rate was 36 per cent, 16 per cent, 39 per cent and 27 per cent for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
respectively (IMF 2011). 
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1 Literature Review 
A growing literature has generated two contrasting views on how China’s industrial 
dynamism affects the industrial development of its neighbours. One view is that China’s rise 
helps the industrial development of neighbouring countries. The focus of this stream of the 
literature is on the growing integration of East Asian economies propagated by regional 
production networks of transnational corporations (TNCs) from developed countries (Ando 
and Kimura 2003; Ng and Yeats 2003; Ando 2006). China has emerged as a major assembly 
centre for these regional production networks, but has so far depended largely on imported 
capital equipment, components and technology (Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kescenci 2007). 
The proponents of this view contend that China’s emergence as a major export platform 
benefits its neighbours as it has created opportunities for them to supply the necessary 
inputs for China’s export production (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Athukorala 2009). 
The other view sees China’s economic rise as a constraint on the industrial development of 
its neighbours because its impact is largely competitive. Proponents of this view argue that 
China’s huge production capacity combined with remarkable levels of price competitiveness 
exert enormous economic pressure on firms in neighbouring countries in their home and/or 
third country export markets (Roland-Holst and Weiss 2004; Coxhead 2007). 
Attempts to synthesise these opposing views by Eichengreen (2006),3 and Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2007) suggest a way of resolving the debate. By analysing trade data that 
differentiate between trade in final and intermediate products, these authors argue that the 
impact varies by country type.4 Complementary effects are limited to more advanced 
neighbours that form integral elements of regional production networks as these countries 
provide the capital equipment, core components and materials that China depends on. 
China’s less-developed neighbours are not positioned to gain from complementary effects 
because they are largely excluded from regional production networks. On the contrary, they 
suffer from cut-throat competition both at home and in export markets, as they specialise in 
labour-intensive industries in which China has attained such remarkable levels of 
competitiveness. 
Albeit helpful, the above synthesis still neglects a critical aspect of the impact of China’s rise: 
the dynamics of change. Although to date, this element has not been a subject of empirical 
examination, the literature does suggest that China’s impact may change over time. In terms 
of complementary effects, Lall and Albaladejo (2004: 1457) argue that China’s impact may 
evolve as the country accumulates capabilities with regard to the production of the capital 
equipment, core components and/or materials that it currently imports from its economically 
advanced neighbours.5 
There has been limited empirical research to date into competitive effects. Nevertheless, 
several previous studies that have examined in general terms how competition with China 
has affected developing country producers provide useful insights. While there have been 
cases in which imports from China indeed displaced developing country producers (Alvarez 
and Claro 2009; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009), there have been other cases in which 
competition induced innovation responses from incumbent producers (Sonobe and Otsuka 
                                               
3
 Eichengreen et al. (2007) provide the trade data analysis on which Eichengreen (2006) is based. 
4
 The classification adopted differs by author but the underlying concept is the same. Athukorala (2009) employs a similar 
approach. 
5
 Lall and Albaladejo (2004) do not offer a concrete answer as to whether this is a probable scenario. Athukorala (2009) also 
raises a related question concerning how long China’s reliance on imported components can continue, concluding that such 
dependence will be sustained in the short to medium term, given the maintenance of China’s comparative advantage in 
unskilled labour. 
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2010). Tegegne (2009) found different responses even among producers in a single industry: 
small and medium shoe manufacturers in Ethiopia responded to Chinese imports by 
improving design, quality and response time, although micro-enterprises reduced their 
production, labour force, and working hours. This means that the competitive effects of China 
may change depending on whether developing country producers strengthen their 
competitive edge vis-à-vis Chinese products. 
In summary, we know from the existing literature that there are two contrasting views about 
the impact of China on its neighbours, one optimistic and the other pessimistic, and that the 
actual impact depends primarily on type of country and sector. The literature also indicates 
that such an impact may change but the process of change and the reasons for change 
remain under-explored. These are the knowledge gaps that this paper seeks to bridge. 
As the existing literature suggests, the impact of China’s economic rise varies considerably 
across sectors and countries. This paper focuses on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry as 
a sector that was affected heavily and early on by massive imports from China. The research 
questions to be addressed are as follows: 
 Question 1: How has China’s impact on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
changed since the early 2000s? 
 Question 2: Why has China’s impact changed in the ways it has? 
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2 Methodology 
Analysing how China’s impact has changed over time poses a major methodological 
challenge. It cannot rely merely on the analysis of trade flows, as much of the research 
reviewed in the previous section has done. Since the impact of China changes as firms 
respond to new opportunities and challenges, research needs to understand what goes on 
inside firms and between firms in the countries affected at different points in time. This 
section starts by introducing methodological approaches to meet these analytical challenges: 
tracing changes over different stages of industrial development and analysing changes within 
and interactions between key value chain actors. This will be followed by discussion of key 
variables and respective indicators and data sources. 
2.1 Stages of industrial development 
Since this research is concerned with understanding changes over time, it is helpful to 
distinguish different stages. The research traces changes over a period of a decade from the 
late 1990s, divided into four distinct stages (Table 2.1).6 In Stage I (mid-1990s to the end of 
the decade), one Taiwanese and three Japanese motorcycle manufacturers established local 
factories, following the Vietnamese government’s decision to launch an import substitution 
policy to promote the domestic production of motorcycles. This stage aims to show the status 
of the industry before the China shock. Stage II(a) was the period of the China shock (2000 
to 2001), when massive numbers of low-priced motorcycle component kits imported from 
China and assembled by local Vietnamese companies dominated the Vietnamese market. 
Stage II(b) was the aftermath of the China shock (2002 to 2004). This period will be analysed 
with the aim of demonstrating the short-term responses of lead firms and suppliers in the two 
sets of value chains under investigation (see Section 2.2). Stage III covers the period of 2005 
to 2009, when the industry entered a fast-growth phase driven by foreign direct investment 
(FDI). The analysis of this period aims to show how the impact of the shock changed the 
industry in the medium term. 
2.2 Value chains 
This study analyses changes within and interactions between actors in two sets of value 
chains organised by lead firms competing for the Vietnamese market. One set of value 
chains – which this study refers to as Vietnamese–Chinese chains – was organised by local 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers that were the key actors perpetrating the China shock. 
As the Vietnamese government had prohibited the imports of assembled vehicles since 
1998, more than 50 of these firms began assembling imported Chinese motorcycle 
components in the early 2000s and accounted for as much as 80 per cent of the Vietnamese 
market in these years (Figure 2.1). Although the China shock only lasted a few years, quite a 
few of these assemblers continued to operate and eventually began the import-substitution 
production of low-priced motorcycles in Vietnam. 
This group of lead firms is analysed both collectively and individually via the in-depth 
examination of six strategically selected case assemblers, referred to as A1 to A6, which 
held relatively large market shares by adopting contrasting strategies (Fujita 2013b). 
Assemblers A1, A2 and A3 belonged to one category of assemblers concentrating on the 
production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand motorcycles. Assemblers A5 and A6 
were typical examples of the other category of assemblers prioritising the development of 
own designs and brand names and quality improvement. Assembler A4 fell somewhere in 
                                               
6
 Whereas previous studies (Fujita 2012, 2013b, forthcoming) divided the historical development of the industry into three 
stages, this paper further partitions the second stage into the period of the China shock and that of its aftermath. 
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between the two categories. While local assemblers, including the six case assemblers, 
operated on relatively small scales upon emergence, the group A1, A2 and A3 rapidly 
expanded their market shares during a later stage of development. 
Table 2.1  Stages of Vietnamese motorcycle industrial development 
Stage Market  
(units sold 
per year) 
Policy Foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers 
Local assemblers 
Stage I:  
Start-up phase  
(late 1990s) 
Less than 
500,000 
Import substitution; 
encouraging FDI in 
domestic production. 
Set up domestic 
production via FDI. 
(Did not exist at this 
stage.) 
Stage II(a):  
The China 
shock (2000–1) 
More than  
2 million 
Import controls and local 
content rules circumvented 
by local assemblers. 
Market shares fell 
substantially. 
More than 50 
assemblers 
entered. 
Stage II(b): 
Aftermath of 
the China 
shock (2002–4) 
Approx. 1.5 
million 
Strengthened enforcement 
of import controls and local 
content rules; restrictions 
on motorcycle registration 
and expansion of 
production capacity by 
foreign manufacturers. 
Honda Vietnam 
launched a low-priced 
model in 2002 and 
recovered market 
share. 
Many exited; 
surviving 
assemblers started 
local sourcing to 
meet policy 
requirements. 
Stage III:  
FDI-led 
development  
(2005–9) 
More than  
2.5 million 
Local content rules, 
restrictions on motorcycle 
registration and capacity 
expansion abolished. 
Fully recovered market 
share; increased FDI in 
component 
manufacturing. 
Consolidated into a 
small number of 
large assemblers. 
Source: Author, based on Fujita (2012, 2013b). 
Figure 2.1  Motorcycle sales in Vietnam by manufacturers 
 
Note: VMEP (Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co. Ltd.) is a 100 per cent-invested subsidiary of Taiwan’s 
Sanyang Motors, and Lifan Vietnam is a joint venture between China’s Lifan Group and a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise. 
Data on ‘Honda (Imported)’ was available from the Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007) up to 2005 but the figures were zero 
from 2002 onwards. Data on ‘Imports’ was provided by General Statistics Office (various years). 
Source: Fujita (2013b), on the basis of the Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007), Industrial Research Institute (2011) and 
General Statistics Office (various years). 
The other set of value chains was organised by the Japanese motorcycle manufacturers that 
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on Honda Vietnam (HVN) for two reasons. First, the company remained the single most 
dominant actor in the industry throughout the period of investigation (Figure 2.1), which 
means that it had a major influence on the development of the sector. Second, HVN was 
most severely affected by the China shock and reacted with the most fundamental 
adjustments to its business model (Fujita 2013b), which makes the company particularly 
relevant in terms of the impact of the rise of China. 
2.3 Key variables, relationships between variables, and 
indicators 
This study seeks to achieve two tasks: (1) to assess the consequences of competitive 
challenges posed by Chinese imports on industrial development performance at different 
points in time; and (2) to explain why the consequences changed over time. 
The first task will be achieved by examining the performance of two groups of actors in this 
industry, namely, lead firms and suppliers in the two sets of value chains identified in Section 
2.2. An industry’s competitive performance depends, above all, on lead firms’ capacity to turn 
out products that are valued by consumers. The following sets of indicators are used to 
assess the market performance of lead firms in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, which 
cater primarily to the domestic market. Since data collected at different times were not 
always based on the same set of quantitative measurements, the focus of this study will be 
on the direction of change rather than the degree of change. 
 Domestic market shares: This indicator shows the relative competitive 
performance of motorcycle manufacturers in the domestic market. However, 
its utilisation requires caution because, as we shall see, government 
regulations may occasionally distort market competition. 
 Price level, product quality and variety: The analysis of market performance 
should also examine the sources of lead firm competitiveness; they include 
price level as well as non-price indicators such as product quality and variety. 
Wherever possible, the performance of lead firms in Vietnam is compared with 
that of their regional competitors. 
While lead firms are important, suppliers are also critical because having a substantial 
domestic agglomeration of suppliers equipped with high levels of manufacturing and design 
competencies helps a developing country not only to increase the value added that accrues 
within the country but also to raise the competitive performance of industries. This study 
assesses the development of suppliers in terms of both quantity, i.e., the number of active 
suppliers participating in value chains under question, and quality, i.e., the types and levels 
of capability the suppliers possessed. The types of capabilities required of motorcycle 
component manufacturers are new product introduction (product development and design) 
and production capabilities (Fujita, forthcoming). In terms of level, the focus will be on 
whether suppliers starting at routine operation for the domestic market (operational level) can 
progress to the level at which they are able to maintain stable and continuous operations that 
fulfil the requirements of foreign customers (assimilative level); and further to the level at 
which suppliers are able to make minor yet original improvements to the existing products or 
production activities (adaptive level) (Sato and Fujita 2009; Fujita, forthcoming). 
The nationality of suppliers is also a key consideration. The existing research has 
emphasised large international ‘follow-source’ suppliers – i.e. those that pursue their 
customers’ investment destinations – as key actors in developing countries (Humphrey 2000; 
Belderbos, Capannelli and Fukao 2000). However, local suppliers also have important roles 
to play as the agents of the host country’s long-term industrial development and 
accumulation of local technological capabilities. This study therefore distinguishes the 
nationality of suppliers and places an explicit focus on local suppliers. 
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The second task is to explain why the Chinese impact on industrial development 
performance changed in the way it did. This study traces the chains of causation linking the 
market competition triggered by the China shock and industrial development performance, 
which is assessed in terms of lead firm performance and the formation of a domestic 
component supply base. In doing so, it introduces a mediating variable: industrial 
organisation. While industrial organisation refers generally to forms of relationships between 
(groups of) firms undertaking various functions along the value chain (Sturgeon 2002), this 
study focuses specifically on the mechanisms by which relationships between lead firms and 
suppliers are coordinated (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). In effect, the analysis 
examines relations between four variables: market competition, industrial organisation, lead 
firm performance and supplier capability building. Figure 2.2 shows the relations between the 
variables. 
Figure 2.2  Relations between variables 
 
Source: Author. 
Market competition affects industrial organisation (arrow #1). The nature of product and 
process specifications exchanged in lead firm-supplier transactions affects industrial 
organisation: goods that are subject to complex and non-standard specifications require high 
levels of explicit coordination, while arm’s-length linkages suffice for products that are simple 
and standard (Gereffi et al. 2005). This means that market competition, by compelling lead 
firms to adjust the features of products and/or processes, may induce changes in industrial 
organisation. 
Industrial organisation influences lead firm performance (arrow #2). The ways industries 
are organised influence the economic performance of firms, industries and countries 
(Sturgeon 2002). Empirical studies also show that certain forms of industrial organisation 
enabled lead firms to extract better performance from their suppliers than others.7 
Industrial organisation affects supplier capability building (arrow #3). One of the 
distinguishing features of different forms of industrial organisation is the magnitude and 
nature of knowledge flows between lead firms and suppliers (Gereffi et al. 2005). Such flows 
of knowledge and technology embedded in transactions indeed have vital roles to play in the 
formation of supplier capabilities (Ernst and Kim 2002; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2004, 2005; 
Schmitz and Knorringa 2000; Schmitz 2006). 
Supplier capabilities influence industrial organisation (arrow #4). The levels of 
capabilities possessed by suppliers affect industrial organisation because they determine the 
division of labour between the lead firms and suppliers that can be implemented, the degree 
                                               
7
 Typical examples include comparative studies of automobile and electronics industries in different countries (Clark and 
Fujimoto 1991; Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Sturgeon 2007). 
    China shock
     #2
  #3
      #1
     #4
Market 
competition 
Industrial 
organisation
Lead firm 
performance
Supplier 
capability 
building
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of transactional coordination required, and the levels of supplier subordination to the lead 
firms (Gereffi et al. 2005). 
A critical point to note is the cause and effect dynamic between industrial organisation and 
supplier capability building (arrows #3 and #4). That is, the building of supplier capabilities 
was not only an important development outcome in itself but also a key factor in influencing 
industrial organisation, or, more precisely, it was one of the prerequisites to the 
transformation of industrial organisation. As we shall see, the direction of causality between 
these two variables is central to explaining the changing impact of the rise of China on the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. 
2.4 Data sources 
The study integrates industry-level and firm-level data. Industry-level data include published 
and unpublished statistics obtained from various organs of the Vietnamese government and 
companies, and reports and research papers. Firm-level data comprise data on key actors in 
the two sets of value chains discussed in Section 2.2. These were obtained during repeated 
rounds of fieldwork conducted by the author in Vietnam and Thailand between 2001 and 
2010. 
Full details of analyses of the dynamics of industrial organisation and local suppliers’ 
capability building using these data are compiled in Fujita (2013b) and Fujita (forthcoming) 
respectively. Fujita (2013b) provides findings on how industrial organisation was determined 
by market competition (arrow #1 in Figure 2.2) and supplier capabilities (arrow #3). Fujita 
(forthcoming) provides findings on how the building of supplier capabilities was influenced by 
the way in which lead firms coordinated relations with their suppliers (arrow #4). The present 
analysis of the relation between industrial organisation and lead firm performance (arrow #2) 
is based on additional data compiled for this paper using the aforementioned indicators (i.e. 
domestic market share, price level, and product quality and variety). 
 
12 
3 Transformation of the Vietnamese 
Motorcycle Industry 
This section examines the transformation of the industry in response to China’s rise. It 
discusses the status of the industry before the China shock and then analyses what actually 
occurred during the shock and how its impact changed in the short and medium terms. 
3.1 Stage I: Before the China shock 
In the mid-1990s, the Vietnamese government launched an import substitution policy in 
respect of foreign-made motorcycles. Attracted by the growing market, the world’s four major 
motorcycle manufacturers (Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki from Japan, and Sanyang from 
Taiwan) invested in Vietnam in the mid- to late 1990s. 
At this stage, HVN was far from regionally competitive. Although Honda-brand products 
dominated the market, they largely constituted imports (Figure 2.1), mainly from Thailand. 
Even though the Vietnamese government prohibited the importation of assembled vehicles in 
1998, Honda-brand vehicles continued to come into the country as incomplete knockdown 
components. HVN’s products failed to compete against imported Honda-brand motorcycles 
because the company’s made-in-Vietnam models were priced approximately 45 per cent 
higher than equivalent products in Thailand and at similar levels to imported Thai-made 
models, inclusive of transport and distribution costs (Table 3.1). These Thai-made Honda-
brand models had high prestige with Vietnamese consumers (Nguyen and Hoa 1998: 134). 
Table 3.1  Regional price comparison of Honda motorcycles 
 Stage I Stage II(b) Stage III 
HVN models US$2,100 (official price of the 
Super Dream in 1998) 
US$719 (official price of 
the Wave Alpha in 2002) 
US$1,564 (official price 
of the Click in 2008) 
Honda-brand 
models made 
in Thailand 
US$1,450 (Honda-brand model in 
1998; price in Thailand) 
US$2,300 (Dream II imported 
from Thailand; price in Vietnam) 
US$694 (official price of 
the Wave 100 in 2002) 
US$1,108 (official price 
of the Click in 2006) 
Sources: Nikkei Newspaper, 6 January 1998; Oto-xe may (Automobiles and Motorcycles), August 2002: 39, January 2007: 100; 
Nguyen (2004: 234); Mizuno and Kitano (2000: 137); Mishima (2010: 216). 
Moreover, the Vietnamese motorcycle component supply base was seriously 
underdeveloped. Apart from a limited number of foreign-invested suppliers that had followed 
Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturers to Vietnam, there were virtually no local specialised 
component suppliers at this stage (Fujita 2013b). 
HVN thus depended on a dozen Japanese and a handful of Vietnamese suppliers (Table 
3.2). None of the latter had previous experience of manufacturing motorcycle components or 
serving global customers, but they gradually learned and acquired advanced production-
related capabilities with generous technical assistance from HVN. Nevertheless, their 
production-related capabilities still largely remained at the operational level at this stage 
(Fujita, forthcoming). 
In short, HVN was far from regionally competitive and the Vietnamese component supply 
base remained underdeveloped. However, none of the actors was compelled to adjust 
strategies at this stage. After all, there were only a few players, all of whom manufactured 
products with largely similar attributes, that is, high-quality and expensive models transferred 
from other higher-income markets. 
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Table 3.2  HVN’s local sourcing 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Local content ratio 44% 52% 83% 90% 
Total number of suppliers in Vietnam 16 20 43 58 
Japanese suppliers 12 15 18 26 
 of which members of Honda Group 5 6 6 11 
Taiwanese and Korean suppliers 0 0 12 14 
Vietnamese suppliers 4 5 13 18 
Source: Fujita (2013b), based on the author’s interviews with HVN. Suppliers belonging to the Honda Group were enumerated 
by the author on the basis of Toyo Keizai Inc. (2009). 
3.2 Stage II(a): The China shock and its immediate 
consequences 
On the basis of the above account, one would expect massive imports of low-priced Chinese 
products to have had severe competitive effects on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. 
Indeed, this is exactly what happened. 
Figure 3.1 confirms the magnitude of the China shock. Chinese exports of motorcycles to 
Vietnam surged dramatically from 2000 to 2001. Similar to imported Honda-brand 
motorcycles in the late 1990s, these Chinese vehicles arrived in the form of knockdown 
component kits in order to circumvent the ban on the importation of assembled vehicles. 
More than 50 local Vietnamese firms were engaged in the assembly of the Chinese 
component kits that were, in essence, copies or slightly modified imitations of a few popular 
Japanese base models (Fujita 2013b). 
Figure 3.1  China’s exports of motorcycles to Vietnam 
 
Source: Global Trade Information Services, Inc. (2012). 
Unsurprisingly, the China shock had a strong negative impact on the nascent Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry. With prices as low as half to one-third of the domestically produced 
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foreign-brand models,8 Chinese motorcycles penetrated the medium- and low-income 
consumer markets that had been unexploited by foreign motorcycle manufacturers. These 
foreign manufacturers experienced a sharp drop in market share. Honda, in particular, saw 
its market share decline from 67 per cent in 1998 (including 27 per cent for HVN’s 
domestically produced motorcycles and 40 per cent for imported Honda-brand motorcycles) 
to 12 per cent in 2001 (9 per cent for the former and 3 per cent for the latter) (Figure 2.1). 
3.3 Stage II(b): The short-term impact of the China shock 
The China shock caused severe damage to Vietnam’s motorcycle production; however, this 
was not the end of the story. A number of important developments took place within a few 
years of the shock. The following sub-sections discuss how industrial development outcomes 
changed within a few years of the China shock. 
3.3.1 Market performance of lead firms 
Lead firms were compelled to adjust their product strategy by intense competition triggered 
by the China shock, together with the Vietnamese government’s attempts to restore order in 
the industry by strengthening the enforcement of import controls and local content rules that 
had previously been circumvented. Japanese companies, perceiving Vietnam to be a symbol 
of an expanded Chinese threat that was already apparent in China, initiated company-wide 
efforts to regain market shares. This culminated in the launch of a new, low-priced model by 
HVN in 2002. The new model, named Wave Alpha, was priced at approximately one-third of 
its previous models. 
The launch of the new Wave Alpha model helped Honda improve its market performance. 
The model quickly gained popularity as the low quality of Chinese motorcycles had by now 
become apparent to Vietnamese consumers (The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007). 
HVN’s market shares increased from 12 per cent in 2001 to 36 per cent by 2004 (Figure 2.1). 
Unlike in the 1990s, HVN’s domestically produced motorcycles now accounted for the 36 per 
cent market share, while the market shares of imported Honda-brand motorcycles had gone 
down to 0 per cent (ibid.). This was achieved by a remarkable improvement in HVN’s price-
based competitiveness. The Wave Alpha was priced at a level broadly similar to an 
equivalent model launched in Thailand the same year (Table 3.1), while the vehicle’s 
performance standards were only slightly modified – mostly downwards – to reflect the 
specific user conditions of Vietnam.9 However, further recovery was prevented by the 
Vietnamese government’s policy that had prevented foreign motorcycle manufacturers from 
investing in additional production capacity.10 Consequently, HVN’s production increased 
substantially in 2002 but only modestly in the following two years (Figure 2.1). 
In the meantime, local assemblers struggled as the Vietnamese government stepped up the 
enforcement of the import controls and local content rules which they had circumvented 
during the years of the China shock. Their performance faltered, with their combined market 
shares declining from 80 per cent in 2001 to 30 per cent in 2004 (Figure 2.1), suggesting that 
local assemblers collectively had lost out to HVN and other foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers. It naturally follows that local assemblers’ individual market shares were in an 
                                               
8
 The average price of imported Chinese motorcycles was US$1,000–US$1,100 in 1999, but had fallen dramatically to 
US$500–US$600 by 2001 (Nguyen 2004: 236). 
9
 For example, the maximum driving speed applied in defining product and process parameters for the Wave Alpha was set at 
80 kilometres per hour. Even though this was much lower than standard levels applied to Honda’s other overseas markets, it 
was considered sufficient for use in the Vietnamese context where traffic congestion prevented motorcycle use at higher speeds 
(Amano and Shintaku 2010: 799). 
10
 The Vietnamese government required foreign motorcycle manufacturers to operate according to the feasibility studies they 
submitted to the authorities when they applied for investment licences. This prevented the foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
from investing in the rapid expansion of production capacity, which had not been envisaged in the late 1990s (Fujita 2011). 
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even more parlous condition, the 30 per cent combined share of 2004 being achieved by 
numerous firms operating on a very small scale. For example, local assemblers turning out 
40,000 units or fewer per year accounted for 60 per cent of the motorcycles produced by 
local assemblers in 2004 (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2  Motorcycle production by local assemblers, by scale of 
production 
 
Note: The number of assemblers producing fewer than 10,000 units per year in 2005 is not provided. 
Source: The Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007: 27). 
Table 3.3  Average product prices and market shares of selected local 
assemblers (US$) 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Wave Alpha 
(HVN’s low-
priced model) 
Average unit price 
of motorcycles 
exported by China 
2004 365 
(8.5%) 
451 
(8.8%) 
n/a 
(3.8%) 
439 
(1.9%) 
622 
(1.3%) 
n/a 
(n.a) 
819 374 
2007 310 
(23.1%) 
n/a 
(1.8%) 
279 
(8.3%) 
373 
(1.6%) 
745 
(5.1%) 
497 
(2.8%) 
801 398 
Note: Market shares of respective assemblers among all registered Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers are shown in the lower 
columns in parentheses. The data on Chinese exports were calculated on the basis of data from Global Trade Information 
Services, Inc. (2012). 
Source: Questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted by the author in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, 
Vietnam Academy of Social Science in 2004 and 2007. 
However, such a decline in market share was not because local assemblers had lost their 
price-based competitiveness. On the contrary, the prices of their products were favourable 
even compared with those of Chinese imports. Table 3.3 shows the average prices of 
products for four of the six case assemblers for which data were available for the year 2004. 
Domestically, their vehicles were priced 25 per cent to 55 per cent lower than HVN’s low-
priced model and at levels similar to the average unit price of China’s motorcycle exports. 
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Rather, local assemblers lost their market share due to the low quality of their products. Their 
models failed to appeal to Vietnamese consumers who, after experiencing serious quality 
issues with Chinese motorcycles, increasingly opted for better-quality Japanese models (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 11). 
3.3.2 Development of component suppliers 
The intense price-based competition triggered by the China shock, combined with the 
strengthened enforcement of the local content rules, compelled both HVN and local 
assemblers to explore low-cost component sources within Vietnam (Fujita 2013b). The result 
was a significant boost to the domestic component supply base as a whole. 
An important transformation was underway in HVN’s value chains, as the launch of a low-
priced model called for significant reduction in procurement costs. Since only limited 
numbers of Japanese suppliers had set up production in Vietnam, HVN inevitably found it 
necessary to mobilise non-Japanese suppliers (Fujita 2013b). As a result of an extensive 
search and provision of technical assistance, HVN’s portfolio of suppliers in Vietnam 
expanded from 16 in 1998 to 43 in 2004, with local firms increasing from five to 13 over the 
same period (Table 3.2). 
Another important development that took place within HVN’s value chains was the 
emergence of second-tier suppliers. Faced by radical price reduction targets imposed by the 
lead firm as it launched the budget model, HVN’s first-tier suppliers sought to replace 
imported subcomponents and materials with locally sourced ones (Fujita 2007, 2011). 
Although the precise number of the resultant second-tier suppliers is unknown, Fujita (2007: 
18) found that six of HVN’s first-tier suppliers (three Taiwanese, one Korean, and two 
Japanese) used an average of 27 second-tier suppliers in 2005, and that the single Korean 
firm traded with as many as 50 second-tier suppliers. Unlike first-tier suppliers, most of which 
were large state-owned enterprises, local second-tier suppliers included numerous private 
firms operating on a much smaller scale (Fujita 2011). 
HVN’s first- and second-tier suppliers not only increased in number but also improved their 
production-related capabilities.11 Progress was particularly remarkable among the first-tier 
suppliers. They started to progress from a rudimentary (operational) level of capability upon 
entry into an HVN chain, with some even reaching a more proficient (assimilative) level of 
capability in Stage II (Fujita, forthcoming). Second-tier suppliers made more modest yet 
steady progress in improving their production-related capabilities (ibid.). 
In the meantime, local assemblers steadily increased local sourcing in response to 
government policy requirements. They were no longer assemblers of imported Chinese 
components. Indeed, 29 of 45 assemblers operational in 2002–3 reached local content ratios 
of more than 40 per cent.12 Local assemblers’ dependence on imported components 
decreased significantly between 2000 and 2003 (Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4  Value of imported components per vehicle sold (US$) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
HVN 692 641 275 231 203 218 
Local assemblers 506 338 181 179 420 396 
Source: Fujita (2013b), based on data provided by the Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007). 
                                               
11
 HVN’s suppliers achieved limited acquisition of new product introduction capabilities. This was because primarily the lead 
firm conducted product development and design, including of components (Fujita, forthcoming). 
12
 Based on a survey conducted by the National Economic University and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
(Nguyen 2004: 259). 
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This happened as a large number of firms entered Vietnamese–Chinese chains in response 
to high demand for standardised components without stringent quality requirements. 
Although precise figures are not available, a conservative estimate – made on the basis of 
official statistics – of the number of suppliers operating in such chains is 50. This included: 
(1) limited numbers of Taiwanese and Korean firms, most of which were specialist 
component suppliers already incorporated into the value chains of Japanese and/or 
Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturers; and (2) numerous local firms that had previously 
operated in related fields, for example, the production of motorcycle or bicycle spare parts 
(Fujita 2007, 2013b). 
After entering a Vietnamese–Chinese chain, a local supplier acquired basic capabilities in 
new product introduction and production. In-depth analyses of sampled suppliers in such 
chains found that capabilities acquired were largely rudimentary (operational level), although 
they extended over a wide range of functions covering both product introduction and 
production (Fujita, forthcoming). 
In summary, the local motorcycle industry started to show positive signs of recovery within a 
few years of the China shock. Lead firm competitiveness improved albeit subject to 
limitations; and the local component supply base grew, allowing ample space for Vietnamese 
firms to enter value chains and accumulate new capabilities. 
3.4 Stage III: Medium-term impact of the China shock 
Several years after the China shock, a new stage of industrial development began. The 
dismantling of interventionist policies that had repressed overall market growth and distorted 
competition against foreign motorcycle manufacturers gave a major boost to the market as a 
whole; stimulated the rapid expansion of foreign motorcycle manufacturers, HVN in 
particular; and spurred the struggle of local assemblers to respond to the penetration of HVN 
into the middle-income market (Fujita 2013b). The following subsections discuss how 
industrial development outcomes changed as a result of such medium-term impact. 
3.4.1 Market performance of major lead firms 
In Stage III, HVN emerged as a dominant actor, accounting for roughly half of the 
Vietnamese motorcycle market in 2008 (Figure 2.1). This achievement was driven by the 
company’s active attempts to seize the growing market by launching a variety of increasingly 
sophisticated models while achieving incremental quality improvement and cost reduction. 
From 2005 onwards, HVN launched an increasing number of new models (Table 3.5). The 
bulk of these were middle- to high-end vehicles: some of these featured sophisticated 
designs, product performance and quality, while others featured only one or two of these 
attributes. These vehicles combined to account for an ever more significant proportion of 
company sales (Fujita 2013b). 
In terms of regional comparison, HVN’s newly launched models were priced 40 per cent 
higher than similar models produced by Honda Thailand (Table 3.1). However, this anomaly 
was probably more due to the fact that the receding competitive threat of China in Vietnam 
meant that HVN was less compelled to implement an aggressive pricing strategy, rather than 
because HVN’s price competitiveness relative to Honda Thailand had deteriorated. On the 
contrary, there is evidence to suggest substantial improvements to HVN’s overall productive 
performance at this stage. First, the growing production was vital for productive efficiency of 
both lead firms and suppliers in this capital-intensive industry (Fujita 2013b). HVN’s annual 
production increased rapidly after 2005 (Figure 3.3), even outpacing that of Honda Thailand 
in 2007 (Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 2010). It also exceeded 1 million units by 2007, the minimum 
efficient scale for components requiring capital-intensive production processes (Fujita 2013b: 
48). Second, as will be discussed in detail in Section 3.4.2, the entry of numerous foreign-
invested suppliers attracted by the growing market made competition between suppliers 
18 
increasingly intense. This in turn enabled HVN to impose increasingly challenging 
performance targets on suppliers (Fujita 2013b, forthcoming). 
Table 3.5  Number of new models registered by year 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
HVN 2 1 5 6 9 17 27 35 102 
Local assembler A1 28 11 4 28 105 112 191 66 545 
Local assembler A2 19 15 0 10 8 8 15 0 75 
Local assembler A3 10 1 5 25 43 56 112 8 260 
Local assembler A4 8 6 4 8 23 16 9 9 83 
Local assembler A5 19 9 4 7 8 21 15 3 86 
Local assembler A6 0 1 2 5 10 12 10 1 41 
Source: Fujita (2013b), based on from data obtained from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), accessed 6 January 
2009. 
 
Figure 3.3  HVN’s motorcycle production 
 
Source: Fujita (2013b), based on Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (various years). 
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The mounting dominance of foreign motorcycle manufacturers notwithstanding, local 
assemblers survived in the market because they improved their price- and non-price-based 
competitiveness. Indeed, their collective market shares rose from 30 per cent in 2004 to 36 
per cent in 2005–6 (Figure 2.1). More importantly, local assemblers consolidated themselves 
into a small number of firms operating on a larger scale (Figure 3.2). For example, among 
those selected for the in-depth case study, assemblers A1 and A3 sold a total of 300,000 and 
95,000 units respectively in 2007, together accounting for approximately one-third of the total 
number of motorcycles sold by local assemblers that year (Fujita 2013b: 60). 
In order to serve low-income consumers in rural areas where even HVN’s low-priced model 
had failed to penetrate, these assemblers further boosted their price-based competitiveness. 
Domestically, the products of assemblers A1 and A3 were priced at 39 per cent and 35 per 
cent respectively of HVN’s low-priced model; and regionally, the prices of their products in 
2007 were even lower than the average unit price of Chinese exports (Table 3.3). 
Moreover, A1 and A3 also increased the non-price dimensions of competitiveness. One of 
the striking features of these assemblers – as opposed to other local firms operating on a 
smaller scale – was the large variety of models they introduced (Table 3.5). Although their 
models carried imitated Japanese designs and/or brands, a wide range of minor cosmetic 
modifications proved effective in penetrating the low-end consumer market (Fujita 2013b). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the quality of motorcycles produced by local 
assemblers had improved in comparison to the previous stage.13 
3.4.2 Development of component suppliers 
Vietnam’s component supply base experienced further development and consolidation in 
Stage III. HVN further expanded local sourcing. Its local content ratio continued to increase, 
reaching 90 per cent by 2007 (Table 3.2) despite the fact that local content rules were 
abolished in 2003, and import tariffs on motorcycle components from ASEAN countries – 
including Thailand and Indonesia – on which HVN had been heavily dependent for supplies 
were reduced to 5 per cent in 2006. The same table shows that, unlike during the previous 
stage, this change was achieved primarily by using foreign-invested suppliers, and Japanese 
firms in particular, while the number of local suppliers increased only modestly. Market 
growth combined with improvement in the overall investment environment14 triggered the 
entry of numerous foreign suppliers (Fujita 2013b: 48-9). In the meantime, local first-tier 
suppliers faced higher barriers to entry and intense competition in HVN chain. While the 
entry barriers were lower at the second tier, the entry of a large number of suppliers 
previously operating in Vietnamese–Chinese chains (see below) made competition 
increasingly intense at this level. 
Local assemblers adopted a somewhat different strategy. As the local content rules were 
abolished, local assemblers as a whole increased their dependence on imported 
components, reversing their previous move towards domestic sourcing. Following a 
temporary decline from 2002 to 2003, their dependence on imported components increased 
after 2004 (Table 3.4). This suggests that local assemblers sought to exploit advanced 
component supply bases overseas. 
However, within Vietnam, assemblers grew to depend on an emerging pool of highly 
competent suppliers equipped with the capability to reverse-engineer and implement 
                                               
13
 In 2007, the general director of a Japanese supplier pointed out that the performance tests of vehicles produced by local 
assemblers in Vietnam had found no substantial difference from genuine Honda-brand products when operated at normal 
speeds; although they were found to be much less reliable when operated at high speeds of 150km to 180km per hour 
(interview on 20 November 2007). 
14
 A series of policy reforms in 2005 implemented in preparation for World Trade Organization (WTO) accession significantly 
improved Vietnam’s investment climate, resulting in a sudden surge of FDI from 2006 to 2008 (Tran Quang Tien 2009). 
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cosmetic and functional modifications to Japanese component designs and to manufacture 
them in large scale to reasonable quality levels. Of 24 Vietnamese, Taiwanese, Korean and 
Chinese suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains interviewed by the author in Stage III, four 
Chinese and three Vietnamese suppliers expanded their production by serving a 
considerable number of local assemblers. Many of the remaining suppliers were faced with 
diminishing orders from local assemblers and transferred either to Japanese chains, where 
they operated mainly as second-tier suppliers, or to other industries (Fujita 2013b: 62-64). 
Surviving suppliers were notable for the extent to which they built new product introduction 
and production capabilities. The capabilities to reverse-engineer existing component designs, 
conduct minor cosmetic modification and conduct large-scale manufacturing to reasonable 
quality standards enabled these suppliers to expand sales to a large number of local 
assemblers.15 
As local suppliers in both HVN and Vietnamese–Chinese chains faced intense competition, 
there was no longer a reserved space for them. Those in HVN chains had to compete with 
Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean suppliers; while those in Vietnamese–Chinese chains vied 
with Chinese suppliers. The result was a growing division between two groups of local 
suppliers: a handful of high performers that were rapidly accumulating capabilities and 
expanding orders, and the rest, which lagged behind. 
The former group included most of HVN’s first-tier suppliers and those firms that continued to 
receive large orders from local assemblers. By acquiring increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities, these suppliers won large proportions of the growing orders by HVN or local 
assemblers operating at large scales. The in-depth empirical analyses found that seven of 
HVN’s local first-tier suppliers and one in a Vietnamese–Chinese chain had reached 
assimilative or adaptive levels in the key capabilities required for their operations (Fujita, 
forthcoming). While their numbers were limited, HVN’s procurement manager remarked in 
2009 that, with a number of exceptions, its local Vietnamese suppliers were generally able to 
meet its requirements without hands-on technical assistance (Fujita 2013b: 49) – which by 
definition means that they had reached the assimilative level of production capability. This 
suggests that the above findings can be generalised to most of HVN’s local first-tier 
suppliers, which numbered 18 as of 2007 (Table 3.2). 
The latter group included: (1) those that stayed on as first-tier suppliers in Japanese or 
Vietnamese–Chinese chains but experienced declining orders as they failed to meet lead 
firm requirements; and (2) second-tier suppliers in Japanese chains that struggled to address 
the ever-intensifying competition. These firms made relatively limited progress in improving 
their capability levels, with many failing to acquire the assimilative level of production 
capabilities (Fujita, forthcoming). 
In summary, lead firm competitiveness was substantially boosted within several years of the 
China shock. In Stage III, HVN emerged as a dominant actor, but local assemblers continued 
to claim a market share by improving their price- and non-price-based competitiveness. The 
domestic component supply base continued to expand but, in a divergence from the previous 
stage, there emerged a growing rift between those suppliers that attained sophisticated 
capabilities and grew rapidly, and those that underperformed. Even though local suppliers 
were exposed to mounting competition, a few dozen of their number held on to positions in 
the former group by successfully acquiring advanced capabilities. 
                                               
15
 Typical examples are Chinese supplier C1 and Vietnamese supplier V16 analysed in depth in Fujita (2013b) and Fujita 
(forthcoming), which traded with 43 and 20 assemblers respectively in 2007–8. 
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4 Explaining the Transformation 
The previous section demonstrated that the impact of the China shock on the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry indeed changed substantially over time – but why did this change 
happen? 
If we focus exclusively on the most immediate reaction to the shock, that is, HVN’s launch of 
its low-priced model, the answer is fairly straightforward: it can be explained in terms of 
HVN’s attempt to gain the competitive edge over Chinese imports – an argument 
corroborated by the existing literature on import competition reviewed in Section 1. However, 
the analyses in the previous section uncovered more extensive dynamics encompassing a 
wider range of actors, including local assemblers, suppliers of different nationalities, and the 
Vietnamese government. These dynamics cannot be reduced to the incumbent lead firm’s 
response to the competitive effects of China. As set out in the conceptual framework of this 
study (Figure 2.2), explaining them requires another variable linking market competition with 
lead firm performance and the development of suppliers: industrial organisation. 
Fujita (2013a) showed that the Chinese motorcycle industry rose to prominence in the 1990s 
due to its distinctive model of industrial organisation. Traditionally, the Japanese had 
employed a captive organisational model (Gereffi et al. 2005), characterised by a high 
degree of lead firm control and intervention over smaller and dependent suppliers with the 
aim of promoting the development of lead firm-specific competencies by the suppliers. This 
model served them well in developing lead firm proprietary models and manufacturing these 
to high quality standards for the sophisticated international market. By contrast, the Chinese 
harnessed market-based organisation, in which a large number of lead firms and suppliers 
engaging in arm’s-length transactions intensely competed with each other. This was made 
possible by sharing a few dozen popular Japanese models as de facto standards within the 
industry. The market-based model enabled the Chinese motorcycle industry to achieve price-
based competitiveness in producing copies or slightly modified imitations of Japanese 
motorcycles and to meet the large demand for low-priced products in developing countries. 
Vietnam was the first place outside China where the two models clashed and competed for 
supremacy. The transformation of the industry after the China shock can be explained in 
relation to the transformation of two organisational models. 
In the immediate aftermath of the China shock, a combination of market competition and 
local content rules imposed by the Vietnamese government compelled both HVN and local 
assemblers to adjust industrial organisation so as to improve on their competitive 
performance. However, their attempts to adjust their respective organisational models only 
achieved partial progress at this stage because of the misalignment of relevant capabilities. 
On the one hand, HVN sought to introduce market forces in governing its transactions with 
suppliers, with the aim of radically squeezing procurement costs. Since local content rules 
were in place, HVN achieved this by engaging in extensive searches for non-Japanese 
suppliers in Vietnam, abandoning the company’s initial preference for Japanese and 
especially Honda Group suppliers (Fujita 2013b). Table 3.2 shows that much of the increase 
in HVN’s suppliers in the early 2000s occurred among Taiwanese, Korean and local 
Vietnamese suppliers. However, at this stage, HVN failed to make sustained use of market 
forces for two reasons. First, the company’s limited purchase volume meant switching 
suppliers was not feasible. Due to the Vietnamese government’s policy prohibiting foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers from investing in additional production capacity, HVN’s production 
volume remained around 400,000 to 500,000 units a year up to 2005 (Figure 3.3), far below 
the 1 million units that Honda regarded as a threshold required for dual sourcing (Fujita 
2013b). As a consequence, the substantive level of competition faced by suppliers remained 
limited. Second, limited levels of capabilities possessed by suppliers newly admitted into the 
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HVN chain – with only some reaching the assimilative level (Section 3.3.2) – compelled the 
lead firm to intervene extensively in assisting the development of supplier capabilities (Fujita 
2013b), a key feature of the conventional Japanese model of captive industrial organisation. 
As a result, while HVN succeeded in achieving a radical one-off reduction in procurement 
costs when launching its low-priced model, partial organisational transformation constrained 
sustainment of such a strategy. 
On the other hand, local assemblers, equipped with limited knowledge about products or 
production processes, sought to exploit de facto standardisation of two popular Japanese 
models for duplicative imitation. This enabled local assemblers and suppliers to engage in 
arm’s-length transactions for low-cost production of largely standardised models, but the 
limited supplier capabilities available in Vietnam – even in comparison with the low capability 
requirements that the Chinese organisational model calls for – meant that low product prices 
came at the expense of low quality (Fujita 2013b). Also, vehicles produced by local 
assemblers were largely copies of two popular Japanese models with limited design work to 
meet consumer needs. 
Nevertheless, both HVN and local assemblers’ endeavours to achieve the intended 
organisational transformation in the absence of foreign-invested suppliers created ample 
opportunities for local suppliers to enter value chains and acquire new capabilities – although 
the capability levels remained rudimentary. In HVN chains, after perceiving the lack of 
supplier capability as a constraint on the intended adjustment of its organisational model, the 
lead firm sought to nurture production capabilities by providing technical assistance (Fujita, 
forthcoming). Suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese chains gained the chance to engage in new 
activities and attain new capabilities. However, unlike the HVN chain, this happened largely 
as a result of suppliers' own efforts to mobilise internal or external resources (ibid.). 
In Stage III, further dynamics unfolded as reverse causality began to operate; that is, the 
emergence of new supplier capabilities now increasingly drove the transformation of 
industrial organisation. 
In the HVN chain, new supplier capabilities emerged as a result of two developments: first, 
the entry of Japanese and Taiwanese suppliers – especially Honda Group suppliers – 
attracted by the growing market (Table 3.2); and second, the improved capability levels of 
local suppliers, with most first-tier suppliers reaching the assimilative level and some 
suppliers even attaining the adaptive level of production-related capabilities (Fujita, 
forthcoming). At the same time, with the dismantling of the government restrictions in 2005, 
HVN was finally able to invest in additional production capacity. This resulted in a sudden 
surge of the company’s production volume, exceeding the 1 million-unit threshold required 
for dual sourcing in 2007 (Figure 3.3). These two factors together enabled HVN to take 
advantage of ‘institutionalised competition’ (Sako 1992) among a carefully selected pool of 
suppliers16 to enforce increasingly challenging quality and price requirements on its suppliers. 
In the meantime, HVN’s efforts to search for new local suppliers and provision of technical 
assistance diminished considerably. 
In the meantime, as discussed in Section 3.4.2, Vietnamese–Chinese chains witnessed the 
emergence of Chinese and Vietnamese suppliers equipped with complementary 
competencies to conduct minor design modifications to existing models and to manufacture 
these in large quantities to reasonable standards. The new capabilities enabled these 
suppliers to serve a large number of local assemblers, giving rise to a distinct form of 
                                               
16
 This form of competition is distinguished from market competition in arm’s-length organisation in that (1) the scope of 
competition is limited to those suppliers that pass a careful selection process, the lead firm essentially maintaining long-term 
relations with each of them; and (2) selection of suppliers is not based principally on price but rather on comprehensive ratings 
of quality, cost reduction and delivery performance, the assessment of proposals submitted by suppliers for increasing the value 
of the components, and the lead firm’s policy on the allocation of business shares (Fujita 2013b: 52). 
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industrial organisation in which suppliers – not the lead firms – played the key role in 
coordinating product and process parameters. Under this form of organisation, which Fujita 
(2013b) described as ‘coordination from below’, the above pool of competent suppliers 
conducting minor design modifications and large-scale manufacturing formed a ‘shared 
supply base’ (Sturgeon and Lee 2005) for local assemblers as a whole. This organisational 
form effectively addressed the coordination needs which had been unattended in the 
previous stage; that is, coordination required for achieving decent product quality and for 
making minor cosmetic and/or functional modifications to de facto component designs (Fujita 
2013b). 
These organisational transformations are indeed vital to explain the industrial development 
outcomes in Stage III. As regards lead firm performance, HVN was now able to employ 
‘institutionalised competition’ to impose challenging quality and price reduction targets on its 
suppliers, which enabled the company to meet the gradual sophistication of market demand 
and expand its market share. Nevertheless, several local assemblers managed to stay 
alongside the Japanese as organisational transformation enabled them to capitalise on the 
supplier-driven coordination to realise low prices, high product variety, and reasonable 
quality, and to thrive in the low-income segment of the Vietnamese motorcycle market that 
even HVN’s budget model had not penetrated. 
The local component supply base continued to expand, but this time the expansion was 
driven primarily by the growth of foreign-invested suppliers while local suppliers were 
exposed to intense competition. Local firms that continued to grow and upgrade were limited 
to those that had entered Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese chains at the right time (i.e. 
Stage II, when competition between suppliers was not overly intense), and which had 
maintained their competitive edge vis-à-vis other suppliers in their respective chains by 
steadily building the capabilities required by lead firms. Accordingly, the few dozen suppliers 
that had taken full advantage of their participation in Japanese or Vietnamese–Chinese 
chains to acquire advanced capabilities emerged as core companies in the industry’s 
component supply base. 
Figure 4.1 summarises the foregoing discussion on the changing chains of causation linking 
market competition, industrial organisation, lead firm performance and the formation of 
supplier capabilities. In Stage II, competition drove HVN and local assemblers to adjust their 
organisational models, but the shortage of supplier capabilities constrained the 
transformation of industrial organisation. On the other hand, by Stage III, the rise of new 
supplier capabilities drove full transformation of industrial organisation. It is this changing 
direction of causation between the variables that is vital to explaining the changing impact of 
China’s rise. 
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Figure 4.1  Changing chains of causation in the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry 
(a) Stage II(b) 
 
(b) Stage III 
 
Source: Author. 
 
        Japanese chains: Lead firms actively engage in
   Lack of supplier capabilities       nurturing supplier capabilities.
   constrains organisational       Vietnamese–Chinese chains: Chain participation
   transformation.       provides suppliers with opportunities to engage in new activities.
Market
competition 
Industrial 
organisation: 
partially transformed
Lead firm 
performance: partially 
improved
Supplier
capabilities: 
limited
      Japanese chains: Lead firm requirements/monitoring
      shapes supplier learning.
Formation of supplier capabilities       Vietnamese–Chinese chains: Lead firm inputs
driving organisational adjustment       on design requirements as the basis for supplier learning. 
Market 
competition 
Industrial 
organisation: fully 
transformed
Lead firm 
performance: 
substantially 
improved
Supplier
capabilities: 
substantially 
improved
25 
5 Conclusion 
This paper began by asking the question, does China’s economic rise help or hinder the 
industrial development of its neighbours? The existing literature was found to be largely 
pessimistic about China’s less-developed neighbours that competed head-on with China in 
domestic and third-country markets. This paper has challenged such a view by engaging in 
an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, which suffered 
severe competitive effects of China’s rise in the early 2000s. This concluding section 
summarises the contribution of the paper and suggests areas for future research. 
The key contributions of the paper are twofold. First, it provides empirical evidence to show 
that the impact of China did change markedly over the decade. As expected, the China 
shock initially had a severe negative influence on the nascent domestic motorcycle industry. 
However, the detrimental effects were soon overcome and steadily turned into positive 
results. In the short term, domestic motorcycle production recovered as HVN significantly 
boosted its price-based competitiveness and as the import-substitution production of low-
priced motorcycles started to take root in Vietnam. But a series of interventionist government 
policy decisions imposed constraints on overall industrial development at this stage. This 
was nevertheless a period when ample space opened up for local suppliers – including 
small-scale private firms – to enter motorcycle production value chains and acquire new 
capabilities. 
As policy constraints were removed in the medium term, the industry entered a qualitatively 
new development phase, with HVN emerging as an ever-dominant actor. Yet, several very 
large local assemblers clung on to their market share by catering to the lowest end of the 
market. The component supply base also continued to develop but this time, there was no 
longer a reserved space for local suppliers. As those of different nationalities competed 
intensely for orders, foreign-invested suppliers came to take on a greater role in the country’s 
component supply base. Nevertheless, a few dozen local suppliers continued to grow and 
upgrade by acquiring increasingly sophisticated capabilities, emerging as core companies in 
the component supply base. 
The second contribution of this paper lies in its explanation of why the Chinese impact 
changed over time. The study reached beyond a narrow focus on the immediate response of 
incumbent firms to competitive effects – as seen in the existing literature – and sought 
instead to examine how the impact of China’s rise created repercussions for a wider range of 
actors within the industry at different points in time. The key to understanding these 
dynamics was organisational transformation triggered by the competition between two 
contrasting models of industrial organisation, that is, the Japanese model that prioritised 
quality, and the Chinese model that concentrated on price. The transformation of these two 
models was critical in explaining relations between market competition arising from the China 
shock, supplier capability building, and lead firm performance. 
Faced with market competition, HVN and local assemblers sought to adjust their respective 
models of industrial organisation. However, such modifications took time because intended 
changes could not be made due to initial inadequate supplier capability to support the 
sustained implementation of either organisational model. Nevertheless, in the medium term, 
a combination of policy change, attempts by lead firms to nurture supplier capabilities, and 
the supplier’s own learning initiatives paved the way for the organisational adjustment that 
brought remarkable changes in industrial development outcomes. 
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The overall conclusion of this paper is that assessing China’s impact requires the tracing of 
changes over an extended period of time. What initially seem like negative effects on 
incumbent producers might in the longer term be translated into a major boost to industrial 
development. However, such an outcome is clearly contingent on strong entrepreneurship 
and the seizure of business opportunities by new entrants; the capacity on the parts of both 
incumbent firms and new entrants to invest in and build capabilities; and an environment 
(both domestic and international) that is conducive to strategic responses from all 
stakeholders. 
Indeed, caution is needed with regard to the applicability of the overall findings to other 
contexts. The industrial dynamics that unfolded in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry had 
much to do with a combination of specific conditions, that is, (1) the presence of powerful 
TNCs that were strongly committed to seizing the emerging market and had the capacity to 
respond strategically to the Chinese challenge; (2) active entrepreneurship on the part of 
Vietnamese assemblers, without which repeated rounds of competition would not have taken 
place; and (3) a large pool of local and foreign-invested suppliers who actively exploited new 
transaction opportunities. 
These conditions may not be present in many other industries or countries. Indeed, the 
emerging body of research on Chinese investment in Africa suggests that the absence of 
such conditions in this context has resulted in a situation in which Chinese investors either 
depend on imported inputs or develop enclaves in the host economies, both of which create 
limited spill-over benefits for local firms (Broadman 2007; Gu 2009, 2011). However, there 
are cases in which Chinese imports have triggered innovative responses among local 
producers, for example, the electrical fittings industry in Pakistan (Sonobe and Otsuka 2010) 
and the Ethiopian footwear industry (Tegegne 2009; Sonobe and Otsuka 2010). Therefore, 
similar lines of research might be useful in these and other sectors in order to shed light on 
whether the impact of China’s growth on the development of local firms and industries has 
changed in the short and medium term. 
Lastly, while this paper focused on China’s competitive impact, research is also needed into 
how and why China’s complementary impact changes over time. To date, complementarity 
between China and its neighbours has grown as the former has needed inputs for export 
production. However, complementary effects could diminish over time as China acquires the 
requisite technological capacity to produce the parts and components it currently imports. 
Nevertheless, scope for exploiting complementarity may persist if the neighbours continue to 
improve on their technological edge. 
Since complementary effects emerge from the regional production networks of TNCs 
extending to different countries in the region, research that examines changes in such impact 
is most likely to benefit from applying the methodological approaches employed in the 
present study. This implies tracing changes over different stages of industrial development; 
in-depth examination of key actors along the value chain; analysis of interaction between 
firms; and integration of firm-level and industry-level data. Although rarely adopted in 
research on China’s impact on its neighbours, these are useful tools for analysing the 
complex interactive processes of market change, strategic response, capability building, and 
industrial development. 
27 
References 
Altenburg, T.; Schmitz, H. and Stamm, A. (2008) ‘Breakthrough? China’s and India’s 
Transition from Production to Innovation’, World Development, 36.2: 325–44 
Alvarez, R. and Claro, S. (2009) ‘David Versus Goliath: The Impact of Chinese Competition 
on Developing Countries’, World Development, 37.3: 560–71 
Amano, T. and Shintaku, J. (2010) ‘Honda Nirin Jigyo no ASEAN Senryaku: Teikakaku 
Moderu no Tonyu to Seihin Senryaku no Kakushin’ (ASEAN Strategy in Honda’s Motorcycle 
Business: Launching of Low-Priced Models and Innovation in Product Strategy), Akamon 
Management Review, 9.11: 783–806 (in Japanese) 
Ando, M. (2006) ‘Fragmentation and vertical intra-industry trade in East Asia’, North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance, 17: 257–81 
Ando, M. and Kimura, F. (2003) The Formation of International Production and Distribution 
Networks in East Asia. NBER Working Paper 10167, Cambridge, Massachusetts: National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
Athukorala, P. (2009) ‘The Rise of China and East Asian Export Performance: Is the 
Crowding-Out Fear Warranted?’, The World Economy, 32.2: 234–66 
Belderbos, R; Capannelli, G. and Fukao, K. (2000) ‘Backward Vertical Linkages of Foreign 
Manufacturing Affiliates: Evidence from Japanese Multinationals’, World Development, 29.1: 
189–208 
Broadman, H. G. (2007) Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, 
Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1991) Product Development Performance: Strategy, 
Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry, Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Business School Press 
Coxhead, I. (2007) ‘A New Resource Curse? Impacts of China’s Boom on Comparative 
Advantage and Resource Dependence in Southeast Asia’, World Development, 35.7: 1099–
119 
Cusumano, M. A. and Takeishi, A. (1991) ‘Supplier Relations and Management: A Survey of 
Japanese, Japanese-Transplant, and U.S. Auto Plants’, Strategic Management Journal, 
12.8: 563–88 
Dahlman, C. J. (2009) ‘Growth and Development in China and India: The Role of Industrial 
and Innovation Policy in Rapid Catch-up’. In: M. Cimoli, G. Dosi and J. E. Stiglitz (eds) 
Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 303–35 
Dimaranan, B; Ianchovichina, E. and Martin, W. (2007) ‘Competing with Giants: Who Wins, 
Who Loses?’. In: L. Alan Winters and S. Yusuf (eds) Dancing with the Giants: China and 
India and the Global Economy, Washington, DC and Singapore: The World Bank and the 
Institute of Policy Studies, 67–100 
Eichengreen, B. (2006) ‘China, Asia, and the World Economy: The Implications of an 
Emerging Asian Core and Periphery’, China & World Economy, 14.3: 1–18 
Eichengreen, B; Rhee, Y. and Tong, H. (2007) ‘China and the Exports of Other Asian 
Countries’, Review of World Economics, 143.2: 201–26 
28 
Ernst, D. and Kim, L. (2002) ‘Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local 
capability formation’, Research Policy, 31: 1417–29 
Fujita, M. (2007) Local Firms in Latecomer Developing Countries amidst China’s Rise: The 
case of Vietnam’s motorcycle industry, Discussion Paper No. 97, Chiba: Institute of 
Developing Economies 
http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/543/3/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.97_fujita.pdf  
(accessed 25 November 2013) 
Fujita, M. (2011) ‘Value Chain Dynamics and Local Suppliers’ Capability Building: An 
Analysis of the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry’. In: M. Kawakami and T. J. Sturgeon (eds) 
The Dynamics of Local Learning in Global Value Chains: Experiences from East Asia, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 68–99 
Fujita, M. (2012) ‘How sectoral systems of production promote capability building: insights 
from the Vietnamese motorcycle industry’, Asian Journal of Technology Innovation, 20.S1: 
111-31 www.tandfonline.com (accessed 25 November 2013) 
Fujita, M. (2013a) Exploring the Sources of China’s Challenge to Japan: Models of Industrial 
Organisation in the Motorcycle Industry, Discussion Paper No. 419, Chiba: Institute of 
Developing Economies 
http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1243/3/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.419_fujita.pdf  
(accessed 25 November 2013) 
Fujita, M. (2013b) The Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation: Fighting for 
Supremacy in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry, Discussion Paper No. 420, Chiba: 
Institute of Developing Economies 
http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/1245/3/ARRIDE_Discussion_No.420_fujita.pdf  
(accessed 25 November 2013) 
Fujita, M. (forthcoming) Exploiting Linkages for Building Technological Capabilities: 
Vietnam’s Motorcycle Component Suppliers under Japanese and Chinese Influence, 
SpringerBriefs in Economics, Tokyo: Springer 
Gaulier, G.; Lemoine, F. and Ünal-Kescenci, D. (2007) ‘China’s Integration in East Asia: 
Production Sharing, FDI and High-Tech Trade’, Economic Change and Restructuring, 40: 
27–63 
General Statistics Office (various years) Statistical Yearbook, Hanoi: Statistical Publishing 
House 
Gereffi, G.; Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005) ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’, 
Review of International Political Economy, 12.1: 78–104 
Global Trade Information Services, Inc., (2012) World Trade Atlas Internet Version 4.7e, 
Columbus: Global Trade Information Services, Inc. 
Gu, J. (2009) ‘China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African 
Development’, European Journal of Development Research, 21: 570–87 
Gu, J. (2011) The Last Golden Land? Chinese Private Companies Go to Africa, IDS Working 
Paper 365, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (various years) World Motorcycle Facts & Figures, Tokyo: Editorial 
Office of World Motorcycle Facts & Figures, Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 
Humphrey, J. (2000) ‘Assembler-Supplier Relations in the Auto Industry: Globalisation and 
National Development’, Competition and Change, 4: 245–71 
29 
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (2007) China: Its Impact on the Developing Asian Economies, 
IDS Working Paper 295, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 
www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2009/02461.pdf (accessed 25 November 2013) 
Industrial Research Institute (2011) Ajia Nirinsha Sangyo 2011 Betonamu hen (Asia’s 
Motorcycle Industry 2011: Vietnam), Tokyo: Industrial Research Institute Co., Ltd. (in 
Japanese) 
Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007) Master Plan for the Development of 
Vietnam’s Motorcycle Industry in the Period of 2006–2015, with a Vision to 2020, Hanoi: 
Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Industry 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2011) Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 
Washington, DC: IMF 
Ivarsson, I. and Alvstam, C. G. (2004) ‘International Technology Transfer through Local 
Business Linkages: The Case of Volvo Trucks and Their Domestic Suppliers in India’, Oxford 
Development Studies, 32.2: 241–60 
Ivarsson, I. and Alvstam, C. G. (2005) ‘Technology Transfer from TNCs to Local Suppliers in 
Developing Countries: A Study of AB Volvo's Truck and Bus Plants in Brazil, China, India, 
and Mexico’, World Development, 33.8: 1325–44 
Jenkins, R.; Peters, E. D. and Moreira, M. M. (2009) ‘The Impact of China on Latin America 
and the Caribbean’, World Development, 36.2: 235–53 
Kaplinsky, R. (2008) ‘What Does the Rise of China Do for Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa?’, Review of African Political Economy, 115: 7–22 
Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2009) ‘The Asian Drivers and SSA: Is There a Future for 
Export-oriented African Industrialisation?’, The World Economy, 32.11: 1638–55 
Lall, S. and Albaladejo, M. (2004) ‘China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat to East Asian 
Manufactured Exports?’, World Development, 32.9: 1441–66 
Mishima, K. (2010) Tonan Ajia no Otobai Sangyo: Nikkei Kigyo niyoru Tojokoku Sangyo no 
Keisei (Motorcycle Industry in Southeast Asia: Formation of Industries in Developing 
Countries by Japanese Companies), Kyoto: Minerva Shobo (in Japanese) 
Mizuno, K. and Kitano, N. (2000) ‘Urban Public Transportation in Viet Nam: Improving 
Regulatory Framework’, JBIC Review, 1: 136–40 
Moreira, M. M. (2007) ‘Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in Latin America?’, 
World Development, 35.3: 355–76 
Ng, F. and Yeats, A. (2003) Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are their Implications for 
Regional Cooperation and Growth? Policy Research Working Paper No. 3084, Washington, 
DC: The World Bank 
Nguyen, D. H. (2004) ‘Chinh sach noi dia hoa va su phat trien cua nganh cong nghiep san 
xuat xe may Viet Nam’ (Localisation Policy and the Development of the Motorcycle Industry 
in Vietnam). In: Co quan hop tac quoc te Nhat Ban (Japan International Cooperation Agency) 
and Dai hoc kinh te quoc dan (National Economic University) (eds) Chinh sach cong nghiep 
va thuong mai cua Viet Nam trong boi canh hoi nhap, Tap 2 (Industrial and Trade Policies of 
Vietnam in the Context of Integration, Volume 2), Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Thanh Hoa (Thanh 
Hoa Publishing House), 231–88 (in Vietnamese) 
Nguyen, T. Q. and Hoa, H. L. (1998) ‘Auto and Motorbike Industry – Impact of Vietnam’s 
Policies of Trade and Investment’. In: D. L. Vo (ed) Vietnam’s Policies on Trade and 
30 
Investment and the Development of Some Key Industries, Hanoi: Social Science Publishing 
House, 123–75 
Ohno, K. (2005) ‘Renovating industrial Policy’. In: K. Ohno and V. T. Nguyen (eds) Improving 
Industrial Policy Formulation, Hanoi: The Publishing House of Political Theory, 29–59 
Quoc, H. (2013) ‘Bike Makers Seeking New Markets’, Saigon Times Weekly, May 13: 16–17 
Roland-Holst, D. and Weiss, J. (2004) ‘ASEAN and China: Export Rivals or Partners in 
Regional Growth?’, The World Economy, 27.8: 1255–74 
Sako, M. (1992) Prices, Quality and Trust: Inter-firm Relations in Britain & Japan, Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press 
Sato, Y. and Fujita, M. (2009) Capability Matrix: A Framework for Analyzing Capabilities in 
Value Chains, Discussion Paper No. 219, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies 
http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/867/1/219.pdf (accessed on 25 November 2013) 
Schmitz, H. (2006) ‘Learning and Earning in Global Garment and Footwear Chains’, The 
European Journal of Development Research, 18.4: 546–71 
Schmitz, H. and Knorringa, P. (2000) ‘Learning from Global Buyers,’ Journal of Development 
Studies, 37.2: 177–205 
Sonobe, T. and Otsuka, K. (2010) Cluster-Based Industrial Development: A Comparative 
Study of Asia and Africa, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Sturgeon, T. (2007) ‘How Globalization Drives Institutional Diversity: The Japanese 
Electronics Industry’s Response to Value Chain Modularity’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 7: 
1–34 
Sturgeon, T. J. (2002) ‘Modular production networks: a new American model of industrial 
organization’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11.3: 451–96 
Sturgeon, T. J. and Lee, J. R. (2005) ‘Industry Co-Evolution: A Comparison of Taiwan and 
North American Electronics Contract Manufacturers’, In: S. Berger and R. K. Lester (eds) 
Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strategies in a New International Economy, Armonk, 
New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 33–75 
Tegegne, G. E. (2009) ‘The Developmental Impact of Asian Drivers on Ethiopia with 
Emphasis on Small-scale Footwear Producers’, The World Economy, 32.11: 1613–37 
The Motorbike Joint Working Group (2007) For Sound Development of the Motorcycle 
Industry in Vietnam, Hanoi: The Publishing House of Social Labour 
Toyo Keizai Inc., (2009) Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyo Soran 2009 (Complete Guide to Japanese 
Overseas Subsidiaries 2009), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Inc. (in Japanese) 
Tran, Q. T. (2009) ‘Sudden Surge in FDI and Infrastructure Bottlenecks: The Case of 
Vietnam’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 26.1: 58–76 
Yusuf, S.; Nabeshima, K. and Perkins, D. H. (2007) ‘China and India Reshape Global 
Industrial Geography’ in L. Alan Winters and S. Yusuf (eds) Dancing with the Giants: China 
and India and the Global Economy. Washington, DC and Singapore: The World Bank and 
the Institute of Policy Studies, 35–66 
Brighton BN1 9RE 
T +44 (0)1273 606261 
F +44 (0)1273 621202 
E ids@ids.ac.uk
www.ids.ac.uk
IDS_Master Logo
